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Abstract. This paper presents a model for generating a MAC tag with
a stream cipher using the input message indirectly. Several recent pro-
posals represent instances of this model with slightly different options.
We investigate the security of this model for different options, and iden-
tify cases which permit forgery attacks. Based on this, we present a new
forgery attack on version 1.4 of 128-EIA3. Design recommendations to
enhance the security of proposals following this general model are given.
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1 Introduction
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used to provide assurance of the in-
tegrity of a message, and requires use of an algorithm along with a secret key.
MACs are commonly formed using block ciphers in certain modes, and keyed
hash functions. Recently algorithms to construct MACs using stream ciphers
have been proposed. Some proposals using symmetric ciphers claim to provide
both confidentiality and integrity assurance; these are referred to as Authenti-
cated Encryption (AE).
There is extensive research in the existing literature on generating MAC tags
using block ciphers, but much less on generating MAC tags using stream ciphers.
This may be due to the existence of block cipher standards (DES, AES) with
well known modes of operation. However, the potential for increased speed and
a smaller footprint in hardware (and often software), makes stream cipher based
MACs worth considering.
Lai et al. [10] proposed a cryptographic checksum algorithm based on stream
ciphers. Golic´ also describes a mode of operation to generate a MAC using a
stream cipher [8]. More recently, seven of the thirty-four stream cipher pro-
posals submitted to eSTREAM [6] claimed to provide AE. The current NIST
cryptographic hash competition received sixty-four submissions; seven of these
use stream cipher algorithms to generate a hash value. Although flaws exist in
2these proposals, resulting in none of them being considered as finalists in the
respective competitions, the proposals demonstrate increasing interest in MAC
generation using stream ciphers.
Nakano et al. [12] proposed a general model for generating a MAC tag using
stream ciphers by injecting the input message directly into the internal states of
the ciphers. Their security analysis suggests that the message injection function
is critical for achieving collision resistance for MACs which fit the model. This
relates to [11], in which two methods for direct message injection into the internal
states of the ciphers are examined.
In this paper we analyse proposals for MAC generation which use stream
ciphers in a way that is not considered in the Nakano model [12]. Some existing
stream cipher proposals do not incorporate the input message directly into the
internal state of the cipher. Instead, they use the input message to control the
compression of a bitstream from the keystream generator. We propose a general
model for generating a MAC tag using stream ciphers in this manner, which
we refer to as indirect message injection. We consider possible options at several
stages of MAC generation under this model, and analyse the security implications
associated with these options with respect to forgery attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the phases in generating
a MAC tag, and discusses the forgery attacks on this model. Section 3 describes
our general model for generating a MAC using a stream cipher with indirect
message injection. Three specific stream cipher algorithms that generate a MAC
tag in this way (128-EIA3 [4, 5], Grain-128a [1] and Sfinks [2]) are examined in
section 4. Our security analysis is presented in section 5, and concluding remarks
are contained in section 6.
2 MAC generation
A MAC algorithm takes three inputs: an arbitrary length message M of length
l bits, a k-bit secret key K and a v-bit initialisation vector IV , and produces a
d-bit MAC tag.
2.1 MAC generation phases
The generation of a MAC tag usually involves three phases: preparation, ac-
cumulation and finalization. The preparation phase involves initializing the
internal states of the integrity components of the device, and preparing the in-
put message. Message preparation may involve adding padding bits to either
end of the message M . The accumulation phase is where the input message
is processed and values are accumulated in the internal states of the integrity
components. The finalization phase completes the processing of the MAC tag,
usually by combining the stored value at the end of the accumulation phase with
a mask.
32.2 Forgery attacks on MAC generation
Consider the possibility of a forgery attack being conducted as follows. Suppose
for a message M , a MAC tag MACK,IV (M) is generated using key K and
IV . The sender intends to transmit the message-MAC tag pair to a particular
receiver. Assume a man in the middle attacker intercepts the message-MAC tag
pair, and can modify M and possibly also MACK,IV (M) to calculate a valid
MAC tag MACK,IV (M
′) for a modified message M ′. The attacker then sends
the new pair (M ′,MACK,IV (M ′)) to the intended recipient. If it is possible
to alter M to M ′ and provide a valid MACK,IV (M ′) without any knowledge
of the keystream sequences used to generate MACK,IV (M), the forgery attack
is successful. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of such forgeries for
MACs formed by indirect message injection, for modifications involving flipping,
deleting or inserting bits in the original message M .
3 MAC generation using indirect message injection
Common structures for MAC algorithms use the message directly and accumu-
late message values in a component of the device. Some recent AE stream cipher
proposals use a different strategy. These proposals use the input message to
control the accumulation of a keystream sequence, with the accumulated value
forming the basis of the MAC tag. In this section we describe explicitly a model
for generating a MAC tag using stream ciphers in this manner.
3.1 General structure for AE algorithms
The keystream generator of a stream cipher takes as inputs a secret key K and
a public IV , and generates a pseudorandom binary sequence. Usually these se-
quences are used as keystreams for binary additive stream ciphers to provide
confidentiality for plaintext messages. However, they can also be used for in-
tegrity applications. Where authenticated encryption is required, the sequence
used for the integrity application may be produced by the same generator as
the sequence used for the confidentiality application, but a different keystream
generator could also be used. Figure 1(a) shows a single keystream generator us-
ing K and an IV to produce two different binary sequences, zt and yt, used for
confidentiality and integrity applications, respectively. If one generator is used
to produce both sequences, then we assume that the two sequences are distinct.
Examples of such algorithms include Sfinks [2] and Grain-128a [1]. Figure 1(b)
shows an alternative case where the sequences zt and yt are generated by sep-
arate keystream generators, with distinct keys and IV s for each: KC , IVC , KI
and IVI , respectively. An example of such algorithms is ZUC [4], used in 128-
EIA3. In this paper our focus is on the integrity component of the designs; the
part inside the dashed lines in Figure 1 (for both (a) and (b)). In this figure, we
also use dashed lines from the output ciphertext to the integrity component of
the algorithm to show that either plaintext or ciphetext could be used by this
model to control the segment of keystream to be accumulated.
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Fig. 1. General structure for AE algorithms
3.2 Structure of the integrity algorithm
The integrity component in Figure 1 consists of two registers, each of d binary
stages. The relationship between these two registers, the keystream sequence and
message M is shown in Figure 2.
Shift Register R r[0] r[d-1] 
Register A a[0] a[d-1] 
mi 
MAC tag 
Accumulation  
Finalization  
Final mask 
yt 
Fig. 2. MAC generation using indirect message injection
The first register is a binary shift register, denoted R. Let Rt denote the
contents of R at time t, with Rt = (rt[0], . . . , rt[d − 1]) and initial contents
R0 = (r0[0], . . . , r0[d− 1]). At each time clock t, for t > 0, the contents of R are
updated using the binary sequence y as follows:
rt[i] =
{
rt−1[i+ 1], for i = 0, . . . , d− 2
yt−1, for i = d− 1 (1)
Thus the contents of register R can be considered as a “sliding window” of length
d on the sequence R0||y, where || denotes concatenation.
The second register is an accumulation register, denoted A. Let At denote
the contents of A at time t, with At = (at[0], . . . , at[d− 1]) and initial contents
5A0 = (a0[0], . . . , a0[d− 1]). The contents of A are updated using the contents of
R, conditional on the value of the input message bit mt, according to Equation 2.
If mt = 1 then A is updated by XORing the current contents with the contents
of R at time t; otherwise A remains unchanged:
At =
{
At−1 ⊕Rt−1, if mt = 1
At−1, otherwise
(2)
The input message M controls which d-bit segments of the sequence R0||y
are accumulated into register A. When the ith message bit has been processed,
the value in register A can be expressed as Ai = A0 ⊕ TiMi, where Mi consists
of the first i bits of the message M and Ti is a d × i matrix such that the jth
column of Ti contains Rj , for j = 0, . . . , i− 1; that is:
Ai = A0 ⊕ TiMi
=

a0[0]
a0[1]
...
a0[d− 1]
⊕

r0[0] r0[1] . . . r0[d− 1] y0 . . . yi−d−1
r0[1] r0[2] . . . y0 y1 . . . yi−d
...
... . .
. ...
... . .
. ...
r0[d− 1] y0 . . . yd−2 yd−1 . . . yi−2


m0
m1
...
mi−1
 .
Note also that each row of Ti consists of i consecutive bits from the sequence
R0||y and is closely related to both the preceding and following rows.
When all of the message bits have been processed, the MAC finalization
phase begins. This involves combining the final contents of A with a masking
value F = (f [0], . . . , f [d− 1]). Thus, for a message M of length l we have
MAC(Ml) = Al ⊕ F = A0 ⊕ TlMl ⊕ F (3)
3.3 Optional processes
For the general model using indirect message injection in the accumulation phase,
as shown in Figure 2, we consider several options for the preparation and final-
ization phases, respectively.
In the preparation phase, options relate to the initialization of the two
registers R and A, and to preparation of the message. Either register could be
initialized with fixed values, such as all zeroes; or with key dependent values,
such as a segment from the keystream sequence y. The input message could
be padded, by appending a specified sequence of bits at either the beginning,
the end, or at both places. Alternatively no padding could be applied. If Ml is
padded with n bits, we use Mp to denote the padded message, where p = l+ n.
In the finalization phase, the final contents of accumulation register A are
combined with a mask, as shown in Figure 2. The mask may be obtained from
the sequence used for the accumulation phase, y, or from another sequence. For
AE this may be z the sequence used for the confidentiality application. In some
cases a null mask (all zero values) is used.
64 Current proposals using this model
We examine the MAC generation process for algorithms that use the model
presented in section 3.2, but with slight differences in the options applied. As
each uses the same accumulation process, we describe only the options taken for
the preparation and finalization phases for these ciphers.
4.1 128-EIA3 version 1.4
Version 1.4 of the 128-EIA3 [3] integrity algorithm uses the ZUC stream cipher
[5] as a keystream generator. ZUC is a word-based stream cipher with word size
32 bits, that uses 128-bit secret key and 128-bit IV . The 128-EIA3 MAC tag
has length d = 32 bits.
Preparation phase: 128-EIA3 does not use physical registers for R and A
but they use instead variables k and T to represent these registers respectively.
Register A is initialized with all zero values and register R is initialized with
keystream sequence. Let (y−32, y−31, . . . , y−1) denote the first 32 bits of the
keystream y produced; then
R0 =

y−32
y−31
...
y−1
 .
The input message Ml is padded by adding one bit at the end of the message,
so Mp = Ml||1 = (m0, . . . ,ml−1, 1).
Finalization phase: After all l + 1 bits of the padded message have been
processed, the contents of A at time l + 1 are combined with the final mask, a
32-bit segment from y starting at yl+32. The final MAC tag is given by:
MAC(Mp) =

y−32 y−31 . . . y−1 y0 . . . yl−32
y−31 y−30 . . . y0 y1 . . . yl−31
...
... . .
. ...
... . .
. ...
y−2 y−1 . . . y29 y30 . . . yl−2
y−1 y0 . . . y30 y31 . . . yl−1


m0
m1
...
ml−1
1
⊕

yl+32
yl+33
...
yl+62
yl+63
 .
4.2 128-EIA3 version 1.5
Version 1.5 of 128-EIA3 was proposed in response to a successful forgery attack
[7] on version 1.4. We discuss this attack in more detail in section 5. This version
is identical to version 1.4 except in the starting position of the final mask, ob-
tained from the sequence y. Instead of starting at bit number (l+ 32), the mask
in version 1.5 starts at the beginning of the next 32-bit word of the bitstream.
The final MAC tag is given by:
7MAC(Mp) =

y−32 y−31 . . . y−1 y0 . . . yl−32
y−31 y−30 . . . y0 y1 . . . yl−31
...
... . .
. ...
... . .
. ...
y−2 y−1 . . . y29 y30 . . . yl−2
y−1 y0 . . . y30 y31 . . . yl−1


m0
m1
...
ml−1
1
⊕

y(dl/32e+1)∗32
y((dl/32e+1)∗32)+1)
...
y((dl/32e+1)∗32)+30)
y((dl/32e+1)∗32)+31)
 .
4.3 Grain-128a
Grain-128a [1] is a bit-based cipher from the Grain family [9] with an added
authentication mechanism. Grain-128a uses a 128-bit secret key and a 96-bit
IV , and generates two sequences, zt and yt, used for confidentiality and integrity
applications, respectively. The MAC tag has length d = 32 bits.
Preparation phase: Both R and A are initialized directly from the Grain-
128a bitstreams. Let (y−64, y−63, . . . , y−33, y−32, . . . , y−1) denote the first 64 bits
of the keystream y produced; then
A0 =

y−64
y−63
...
y−33
 and R0 =

y−32
y−31
...
y−1
 .
The input message is padded with a single bit of value 1, so Mp = Ml||1.
Finalization phase: After all l + 1 bits of the padded message have been
processed, the contents of A at time l + 1 represents the final MAC tag. That
is, the final mask is a null mask.
MAC(Mp) =

y−64
y−63
...
y−33
⊕

y−32 y−31 . . . yl−32
y−31 y−30 . . . yl−31
...
... . .
. ...
y−1 y0 . . . yl−1


m0
m1
...
ml−1
1
 .
4.4 Sfinks
The Sfinks [2] stream cipher proposal, submitted to eSTREAM [6], includes an
authentication mechanism. The bit-based keystream generator uses an 80-bit
secret key and an 80-bit IV , to form an initial state for the 256 bits LFSR,
which is the major component of the keystream generator. Nonlinear filters are
applied to the contents of the LFSR to produce two different sequences z and y,
used for confidentiality and integrity applications, respectively. In addition, two
64-bit registers are used in the authentication mechanism in the manner shown
in Figure 2. The Sfinks MAC tag has length d = 64 bits.
Preparation phase: Before processing the message, both R and A are set
to all zero and an initialization algorithm is used to incorporate the first 128 bits
8of keystream (y−128, y−127, . . . , y−1) into the initial values of these registers. This
algorithm consists of updating the two registers R and A 128 times according
to Equations 1 and 2 but with mi = 1 for −127 ≤ i ≤ 0. Note that this process
is equivalent to padding the message at the beginning by concatenating with a
sequence of 128 ones. That is Mp = (1, 1, . . . , 1)||(m0, . . . ,ml−1).
Finalization phase: The final contents of register A are combined (by XOR-
ing) with a final mask that comprises 64 consecutive bits from the confidentiality
sequence z, beginning immediately after the segment used to encrypt the input
message. The final MAC tag is:
MAC(Mp) =

0 0 . . . 0 y−128 . . . yl−65
0 0 . . . y−128 y−127 . . . yl−64
...
... . .
. ...
... . .
. ...
0 0 . . . y−67 y−66 . . . yl−3
0 y−128 . . . y−66 y−65 . . . yl−2


1
...
1
m0
...
ml−1

⊕

zl
zl+1
zl+2
...
zl+62
zl+63

.
5 Forgery attacks
Generating a MAC tag using the input message indirectly is simple and fast,
as the accumulation phase makes repeated use of the XOR operation. In this
section, we analyze the security provided by MACs generated using this model
with respect to a man in the middle forgery attack as described in section 2.2.
In our analysis we assume that the binary sequences produced by the keystream
generators are pseudo-random and cannot be distinguished from truly random
sequences.
Our analysis considers particularly the options for the preparation and fi-
nalization phases, and explores the security implications of particular choices.
In most cases, modifying bits between the ends of a non-zero message changes
which segments of the (unknown) pseudo-random sequence are accumulated into
register A, so this should not lead directly to forgery attacks. Instead we con-
sider forgeries related to the modification of bits at the ends of the message
M . Recall from Equation 3 that the MAC tag MACK,IV (Ml) takes the form
MACK,IV (Ml) = A0⊕TlMl⊕F = (TlMl)⊕ (A0⊕F ). Note that the final MAC
tag is simply the XOR combination of the separate effects of the accumulation
process TlMl and the masking vector A0 ⊕ F . In our analysis, we first consider
the security of the accumulation process TlMl, and then the effect of the masking
elements A0 ⊕ F .
5.1 Security of the accumulation process
Consider a message M of length l, with no padding. Let the vector X =
(x0, x1, . . . , xd−1) denote the output of the accumulation process. We represent
9the accumulation process in matrix form as follows:
X(Ml) = TlMl =

r0[0] r0[1] . . . r0[d− 1] y0 . . . yl−d−1
r0[1] r0[2] . . . y0 y1 . . . yl−d
...
... . .
. ...
... . .
. ...
r0[d− 1] y0 . . . yd−2 yd−1 . . . yl−2


m0
m1
...
ml−1
 .
Where a message M is modified to obtain a new message M ′, we will use the
notation X ′ = (x′0, x
′
1, . . . , x
′
d−1) to refer to X(M
′).
Bit flipping forgeries Consider firstly the case where R is initialized with zero
values. Then all elements in the first column of matrix Tl are zero. Now m0, the
first bit of Ml, has no effect on the value of X(Ml). Thus it is possible to modify
Ml by flipping m0. Let mi denote the complement of mi. The output X
′ for
the modified message M ′ = (m0, . . . ,ml−1) is exactly the same as X(Ml). This
collision clearly leads directly to a forgery; the attacker can provide a valid X ′
for M ′ with probability of 1.
Similarly, since all elements of the second column are zero except possibly y0,
it follows that message bit m1 only affects bit xd−1 of X(Ml). Modifying Ml by
flipping m1 requires the attacker to guess only x
′
d−1 to construct X
′ for the modi-
fied message. For the modified messageM ′ = (m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1), the probability
that X(M ′) will be exactly the same as X(Ml) is therefore 0.5. Similarly, for a
message M ′′ modified in the first two bit positions, M ′′ = (m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1),
the probability that X(M ′′) collides with X(Ml) is also 0.5. In general, if we flip
bit mi and any of the bits up to mi in the original message, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1,
then the probability of collision is 2−i.
Consider now the case where R0 is known and of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0). Then
all elements in the first column of matrix Tl are zero except r0[0] = 1. Now m0,
the first bit of Ml, affects only bit x0 of X(Ml). Thus it is possible to modify
Ml by flipping m0 and to provide a valid X
′ for M ′l = (m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1), by
flipping x0. That is, X
′ = (x0, x1, . . . , xd−1). Thus an attacker can produce a
valid MAC for the forged message M ′ with probability of 1.
Similarly, for R0 = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0), all elements of the first column are zero
except r0[0] and r0[1], and in the second column all elements are zero except r0[1]
and possibly y0. Thus message bit m0 affects positions x0 and x1 of X(Ml), while
message bit m1 affects x0 and possibly xd−1. Modifying Ml by flipping both m0
and m1 requires the attacker to flip only x1 to form x
′
1 and to guess x
′
d−1.
Therefore, the probability that an attacker can construct a valid vector X ′ for
M ′′ = (m0,m1, . . . ,ml−1) is 0.5.
In general, for any known R0, if we flip bit mi and any of the bits up to mi in
the original message, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1, then we can construct a valid X ′ for this
modified message M ′ by flipping the required bits in X and guessing the final
i bits in vector X ′. Therefore, the probability that an attacker can construct a
valid vector X ′ for M ′ is 2−i.
Resistance against this type of forgery attack can be provided in two ways.
Firstly, we could initialize register R using key dependent values, such as a
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segment from the keystream sequence, y. Alternatively, the message Ml may be
padded by concatenating with a segment of all ones, so thatMp = (1, 1, . . . , 1)||Ml.
The padding should consist of at least d ones so that all message bits affect all
bits in X, and hence all bits in the final MAC tag, in an unpredictable manner.
Note that a key dependent initialisation of R may be the more efficient approach,
as padding the message increases both the length of the message and the size
of the matrix T , requiring at least (d+ l) operations to generate the final MAC
tag.
Bit deletion forgeries Suppose we modify M by deleting m0 to obtain M
′
l−1 =
(m1,m2, . . . ,ml−1). Then the matrix Tl−1 for M ′l−1 is just the matrix Tl for Ml
without the last column of Tl. Note in Equation 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1, that row i
in matrix T is row i− 1 shifted one position to the left, and with a new value as
the final element in the row. Applying this to X = Tl Ml and X
′ = Tl−1 M ′l−1,
it follows that xi = r0[i]m0 + x
′
i+1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 2.
Now consider the case where R is initialized with zero values. Then, all
elements in the first column of matrix Tl are zero and hence xi = x
′
i+1 for
i = 0, . . . , d − 2; that is, X ′ = (β,X  1) for some unknown β. We call this
the sliding property of the product Ti Mi. An attacker can guess β, and hence
provide a valid X ′ for M ′ with probability of 0.5. Similarly, an attacker can form
a message M ′′ by deleting i bits from the beginning of the message Ml, and
obtain the new X ′′l−i = (β0, β1, . . . , βi−1, X  i), where the bits β0, β1, . . . , βi−1
must be guessed by the attacker. The attacker will provide a valid X for M ′′l−i
with probability 2−i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Note that for i = d, this is effectively a brute
force attack on X, so this attack is only effective for deletion of up to the first
d− 1 bits of the message. This attack can also be adapted for the case when R0
is non-zero but known; all that is required is to flip appropriate bits of X, as
described earlier in this section, before shifting X and guessing β0, β1, . . . , βi−1.
Suppose now that R0 is unknown but that the first j bits of the message are
known to be zeroes. We can again delete the first i ≤ j bits of the input message,
shift X by i times and guess β0, β1, . . . , βi−1 to get a valid X ′ for the modified
message. The attacker will provide a valid X ′ for M ′l−i with probability 2
−i, for
1 ≤ i ≤ d.
The attacks discussed above can all be prevented by either padding the mes-
sage at the start with at least d ones or by initialising R with unknown bits and
padding the message at the start with a single one.
Now suppose that we try deleting bits from the end of a message. Assume
l > d, if we delete the last bit of M , then xi = x
′
i + y(l−d+i−1)ml−1, for 0 ≤ i ≤
d− 1. If ml−1 = 1, the second term is unknown since it involves keystream bits,
but if ml−1 = 0, then X ′ = X, giving rise to a potential MAC forgery. The same
argument clearly applies for deleting any number of zeroes from the message.
Such forgeries can be prevented by padding the message with a final one.
Bit insertion forgeries Suppose we modify Ml by appending additional zero
bits to the end of the message to obtain M ′l+n = M ||(0, . . . , 0). In our matrix
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representation, adding n zeroes to the end of Ml requires adding n columns
to matrix T . During the accumulation process, regardless of the values in these
columns, multiplying by the additional message bits of value zero does not change
the value of X. Hence X(M ′l+n) = X(Ml), for any n > 0. Again, this collision
leads to an obvious forgery attack which succeeds with probability 1.
Now consider the effects of modifying Ml by inserting an additional bit of
value 1 at the end of the message. During the accumulation process, the addi-
tional column of T will be multiplied by the additional message bit of value 1
and this may change the values in X. An attacker must guess d elements in that
additional column in order to calculate a valid X. So the probability of obtaining
a valid X for this modified message is the same as the probability of brute force
attack on the MAC. Therefore forgery attacks consisting of inserting zero bits
at the end of the message can be prevented if we pad the message with a bit
of value 1 at the end. An equivalent solution, which we discuss in the following
section, is to use a masking term that depends on the message length.
Now suppose we modify Ml by adding a zero bit to the beginning of the
message; that is, M ′l+1 = 0||M . From the structure of Tl and Tl+1, it follows
that x′i = r0[i]0 + xi+1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 2. That is x′i = xi+1 for i = 0, . . . , d− 2,
so X ′ = (X  1, α) for some unknown value α. An attacker can guess α, and
hence provide a valid X ′ for M ′ with probability of 0.5. Similarly, an attacker
can form a message M ′′l+i by adding i zeroes to the beginning of message Ml, and
obtain the new X ′′l+i = (X  i, α0, α1, . . . , αi−1), where the bits α0, α1, . . . , αi−1
must be guessed by the attacker. The attacker will provide a valid X for M ′′l+i
with probability 2−i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. This is the basis of the previously reported
attack on 128-EIA3 version 1.4 [7].
If R is initialised with zeroes, then this attack will work for inserted bits
of either value, since the first i bits of M ′′l+i are all multiplied by zeroes in the
first d− i+ 1 rows of Tl+i. Therefore, the inserted bits affect only the last i− 1
bits of X ′′l+i, which are bits that must be guessed anyway. Further, this forgery
can again be adapted to the case of R0 known (but not necessarily zero), since
the effects of any inserted bits of value 1 can be determined and allowed for in
applying the attack.
From the above discussion, it follows that attacks involving the insertion of
bits at the start of a message can be prevented by ensuring that R0 is initialized
with unknown values (keystream) and that the start of the message is padded
with at least one bit of value 1.
5.2 Security considerations for the masking vector A0 ⊕ F
The forgeries discussed in section 5.1 can all be prevented by suitable choices
of R0 and of message padding; specifically, by initialising R with keystream bits
and padding the message with a bit of value 1 at both ends. The masking vector
A0 ⊕ F provides an alternative method of preventing many of these forgeries.
We now discuss the security implications associated with various options for this
term. If this term is to contribute to the security of the MAC, it is important
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that its contents are unknown to the attacker. Therefore at least one of A0 and
F must be sourced from keystream.
If R0 is known and there is no message padding, the accumulation term
X = Tl Ml is vulnerable to attacks involving insertion or deletion of zeroes
at the end of the message and to insertion or deletion of bits at the start of
the message. (If R0 is unknown, only the attacks involving insertion or deletion
of zeroes apply.) Forgeries involving insertions or deletions at the start of a
message rely on the sliding property of TlMl described in section 5.1. These can
be prevented by using an appropriate mask. It is important that changes in the
length of the message do not result in corresponding changes in the position of
the mask bits. Otherwise the sliding property in the accumulation process will
apply to the MAC as a whole. The easiest way to satisfy this requirement is to
initialise A with bits from a fixed position such as the start of the keystream
sequence y.
Conversely, forgeries involving zeroes inserted or deleted at the end of the
message rely on the fact that the additional bits have no effect on the accu-
mulated value X. Such forgeries can be prevented by using an unknown mask
that depends on the message length, for example by populating F with a se-
quence of keystream bits starting at a fixed distance from the last bit used in
the accumulation process. Together, these choices for A0 and F provide an effec-
tive alternative to message padding as a means of preventing bit insertion and
deletion attacks. Note, however, that the masking term A0 ⊕ F cannot prevent
attacks based on flipping bits of the message.
5.3 Security analysis of existing ciphers
In this section, we show how the previous attack on version 1.4 of 128-EIA3
works using our model and then we extend this attack to a new attack on the
same version of this algorithm. Then we investigate the security provided by the
existing ciphers that follow this model.
Previous attack on 128-EIA3 version 1.4 [7] . Recall that for 128-EIA3,
A0 = (0, . . . , 0), so the masking value is merely the value of F , that is, the
32 consecutive bits of y starting a fixed distance after the last bit used in the
accumulation process. Any increase or decrease in the message length therefore
causes a corresponding shift in the keystream bits from y used to form F .
Now consider inserting a zero at the start of the message. We noted in section
5.1 that the result X ′ of the accumulation process for this modified message is
related to the original value of X by the sliding relationship X ′ = (X  1, α).
Since F also slides by one bit when a zero is appended to the message, the entire
MAC has this sliding property, as noted in [7].
New attack on 128-EIA3 version 1.4 We extend the previous attack on
version 1.4 of 128-EIA3, in the case where the message starts with one or more
zeroes. As discussed in section 5.1, if we delete i of these zeroes, (where i < d),
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the result X ′ of the accumulation process for this modified message is related to
the original value of X by the sliding relationship X ′ = (β0, . . . , βi−1, X  i).
Since F also slides by i bits when these zeroes are deleted, the entire MAC has
this property and a forgery results with probability of 2−i.
128-EIA3 version 1.5 The modification to the starting position of the 32-bit
segment of y used to form F , introduced in version 1.5 of 128-EIA3, breaks the
sliding property on F and provides effective resistance to the types of forgery
just discussed. Resistance to bit flipping forgeries is provided by initialising R
with keystream, and padding the end of the message prevents bit insertion or
deletion forgeries at the end of the message.
Grain-128a The cipher Grain-128a [1], described in section 4.3, initializes both
registersR and A with keystream sequence. Initialising registerR with keystream
prevents forgery attacks due to bit flipping. Initializing register A with keystream
prevents forgeries involving insertion or deletion of bits at the start of the mes-
sage by breaking the sliding property in the accumulation phase. Padding at the
end of the message by one bit of value 1 also prevents bit insertion and deletion
forgeries at the end of the message.
Sfinks For Sfinks stream cipher [2], described in section 4.4, padding is per-
formed by prepending 2d ones to Ml to initialize both registers R and A with
keystream sequence. However, padding by d bits is sufficient to ensure the reg-
ister R is loaded with keystream bits before Ml is processed. Using this way of
initialization prevents forgery attacks due to flipping, insertion or deletion of bits
at the start of the message. Sfinks uses confidentiality sequence z started at zl
for 64-bits as a final mask F . Using a sequence related to the length of the input
message prevents bit insertion or deletion forgeries at the end of the message.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we describe a general model for generating MAC tags using stream
ciphers by injecting the input message, either plaintext or ciphertext, indirectly.
We outline the options available for various phases in this model and examine
the MAC generation processes for three stream ciphers described by this model.
These are 128-EIA3, Grain-128a and Sfinks.
The security analysis in section 5.1 highlights the importance of initialising
register R with keystream bits. This prevents bit flipping forgeries and reduces
the scope of the forgeries involving insertion or deletion of bits at the start of the
message. Prepadding the message with at least d ones is a feasible but arguably
less efficient alternative.
To prevent the remaining bit insertion and deletion forgeries, both of the
following practices must also be adopted:
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1. The message is padded with a 1 at the start and/or register A is initialised
with keystream (from a fixed location in the keystream sequence).
2. The message is padded with a 1 at the end and/or the final mask F comprises
a keystream sequence that depends on the length of the message.
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